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REVVING-UP REVLON IN THE WAKE OF RURAL METRO: 
A CALL FOR DIRECT LIABILITY ON FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
Joseph P. DiCarlo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate business and finance is grounded in transactional expertise.  
In modern business, the decisions made and actions taken by corporate 
directors and officers are critical in the context of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) because of the integral role that these directors and officers play in 
the transactions.1  Equally, if not more, essential is the role of financial 
advisors, namely investment banks.2  Today, 97.5% of M&A transactions 
valuing over $100 million attract stockholder litigation,3 which ensues when 
shareholders believe their investments have been exposed to adverse effects 
of the mergers, such as losses from bad sales or poor decisions by directors 
and officers.4  In such litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys have targeted sell-side 
financial advisors in their search for “deep-pocketed” defendants.5 
Traditionally in stockholder litigation, corporate officers, accountants, 
auditors, and those handling financial reporting were “considered primary 
components in maintaining integrity and public confidence in the 
marketplace.”6  It seems, however, that plaintiffs have discovered that 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2015, 
The College of New Jersey.  I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, 
Stephen Lubben, for his guidance in the writing of this Comment.   
 1  Alexandra R. Lajoux, Role of the Board in M&A, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/alex-
lajoux/ (explaining that directors have two main roles in M&A transactions: readiness and 
oversight).   
 2  Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or 
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 211 (1988).  The financial 
advisor is hired by the corporation for its expertise in the current or prospective M&A 
transaction.  Id.  Often, the chosen advisors are investment banks, which present expertise in 
“price evaluations and assistance in securing financing, issuing new securities, structuring 
bids, and mounting defenses.”  See id.   
 3  Robert S. Reder & Stephanie Stroup Estey, Sell-Side Financial Advisors in the M&A 
Crosshairs, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 279, 280 (2015).   
 4  See generally id. (suggesting that poor decisions from investment advisors and 
directors may result in loss of shareholders’ stock value, resulting in millions of dollars in 
liability).   
 5  Id. at 279.   
 6  Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regulation of 
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financial advisors also play an integral role in M&A, as they have begun to 
target “sell-side financial advisors as a means to obtain monetary 
damages . . . by claiming these advisors aided and abetted alleged fiduciary 
breaches by the target company boards which retained them.”7 
It is well settled that in M&A, sell-side boards of directors can be held 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders of corporations.8  Section 
102(b)(7) of Delaware General Corporate Law, however, permits a 
corporation to include an exculpatory provision in its certificate of 
incorporation that protects individual directors from personal liability to 
shareholders for breaches of fiduciary duties.9  Yet, the statute does not 
mention whether corporate officers or corporate advisors, such as investment 
banks, are similarly shielded.10  Over the past few decades, courts have ruled 
that sell-side boards of directors and corporate officers may be held liable 
for breaches of fiduciary duties resulting from the transaction, if certain 
conditions exist.11  Arguably, the most important case regarding director and 
officer liability in transactions is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings,12 which set the tone for what would eventually become the modern 
“Revlon doctrine.”  In Revlon, the court stated that “[t]he ultimate 
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation falls on 
its board of directors, . . . [which owes] fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
to the corporation and its shareholders.”13 
Modern case law, however, has increasingly targeted sell-side financial 
advisors, namely investment banks, by holding advisors liable for aiding and 
abetting directors’ breach of fiduciary duty.14  The paramount case, which 
set the stage for this new trend over the past few years, is In re Rural Metro 
Corp. Stockholders Litigation.15  In Rural Metro, the court held that a 
 
Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 69, 80 (2002).   
 7  Robert S. Reder & Margaret Dodson, Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Multi-Million 
Dollar Damages Award Against Sell-Side M&A Advisor, 69 VAND L. REV. EN BANC 27, 27 
(2016). 
 8  See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
185 (Del. 1986); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 265, at *68–77 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon 
Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014). 
 9  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 10  See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28. 
 11  See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185; TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *68–77.  
 12  506 A.2d 173. Revlon is integral to the field, as it still serves as the basis for the 
continuing expansion of the doctrine, which this Comment argues is displayed in Rural Metro. 
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 13  Revlon, 506 A.2d. at 179. 
 14  See, e.g., In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
274 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015); TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265; Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54. 
 15  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54 (holding the financial advisors liable for aiding and abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty by directors in sale of company).  
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company’s board of directors had breached its fiduciary duties to its 
shareholders, and subsequently ruled that the company’s advisor, an 
investment bank, had knowingly aided and abetted in the breach of those 
duties.16  Sell-side financial advisors should not take rulings like Rural Metro 
lightly, as the Delaware Chancery Court held the advisor liable for $78.5 
million in damages for aiding and abetting.17 
This Comment highlights the Rural Metro doctrine’s importance and 
its implications on financial advisors in sell-side transactions and mergers.  
Predominantly, this Comment argues that the Rural Metro doctrine is more 
essential than ever as an expansion of the Revlon doctrine, and that financial 
advisor liability should not be dependent on the liability of the directors and 
boards.  Financial advisors have an incredible impact on sell-side M&A 
because of their expertise and influence on the boards of directors, and 
should, therefore, be held to a higher standard.  Part II examines the history 
and background of case law and the liability of different parties in sell-side 
transactions, including financial advisors.  This discussion focuses first on 
the Revlon doctrine, and then highlights key cases that have expanded 
liability in sell-side transactions through use of the Rural Metro doctrine.  
Part III explores the role of financial advisors in M&A.  Part IV examines 
the modern expansion of the Revlon doctrine and its implications on financial 
advisors.  Lastly, Part V proposes that holding sell-side financial advisors 
directly liable to the shareholders is imperative to make the advisors more 
accountable and increase shareholder protection during mergers and 
acquisitions. 
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE: SECTION 
102(b)(7) AND REVLON 
A. Delaware Code § 102(b)(7) 
The Delaware legislature initially lightened the burden of liability on 
directors by permitting exculpation provisions in a corporation’s governing 
documents.18  These provisions remove liability for breaches of the duty of 




 16  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 63.  For a thorough discussion of the Rural Metro case and 
the Rural Metro doctrine, see infra Part IV.C.1. 
 17  Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28; see Manesh, supra note 8, at 134 (“[T]he 
investment banks that knowingly advise or assist corporate boards in an unreasonable sales 
process may face harsh monetary sanctions for aiding and abetting a Revlon violation.”).  
 18  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 19  Id. 
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In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate 
of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of 
incorporation may also contain any or all of the following 
matters: . . . (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, 
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or 
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional 
misconduct or a knowing violation of law;  
(iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which 
the director derived an improper personal benefit.20 
 
In addition to providing protection to the individual directors, section 
102(b)(7) ensures that individual directors and corporate officers “do not 
become overly risk-averse,” though officers are not actually protected under 
the statute.21  Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions have had a profound 
effect on change-of-control transactions because of their power to provide 
complete protection to directors from certain liabilities.22  Ultimately, 
exculpatory provisions eliminate director liability to the shareholders for a 
breach of the duty of care.23  Delaware courts have protected individual 
directors by honoring exculpatory clauses even when they have found that 
the board, as a whole, had breached its duty of care.24 
Despite the favorable protections exculpatory provisions provide to 
directors, these clauses do not expressly protect officers, financial advisors, 
or bad faith directors.  Nor is Delaware legislature’s intent clear from section 
102(b)(7).25  The statutory language refers to individual directors, but “it 
 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. at 87. 
 22  WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 
449 (2d ed. 2016) (stating that an exculpatory provision, as designated in section 102(b)(7), 
“essentially allows a corporation to opt out of having its directors be personally liable for 
monetary damages for breach of the duty of care”).  Revlon ultimately creates a separate duty, 
which is used in change-of-control scenarios.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).   
 23  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 86 (Del. Ch. 2014).   
 24  See, e.g., In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. 
Ch. 2008); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008). Under section 102(b)(7), a 
duty of care claim is essentially destroyed if there is an exculpation provision in the 
corporation’s governing documents.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).  
Therefore, courts will usually protect the directors from liability under the duty of care unless 
their decisions are grossly negligent. McPadden, 964 A.2d at 1273–74.  
 25  See Manesh, supra note 8, at 118.  Directors who act with gross bad faith or 
malevolence may not be protected by the statute.  Id.   
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does not extend to aiders and abettors.”26  In re TIBCO Software Inc. 
Stockholders Litigation, which will be discussed in Part IV, C, illustrated this 
point.  There the Delaware Chancery court held that although the directors 
were not personally liable for their breach of fiduciary duty, the financial 
advisor was liable for aiding and abetting that breach because section 
102(b)(7) does not apply to financial advisors.27  Section 102(b)(7) displayed 
the Delaware legislature’s statutory approach to director liability in M&A 
transactions, and the courts followed with their own approach in Revlon. 
B. The Revlon Doctrine 
Revlon allowed the Delaware courts to consider the scope of directors’ 
liability in sell-side transactions.28  In Revlon, the Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer of Pantry Pride, Inc., met with his counterpart at 
Revlon to discuss a possible acquisition of Revlon, Inc.29  The Pantry Pride 
board subsequently authorized the Chairman to acquire Revlon, and the 
Revlon board met to consider the impending threat of a hostile bid from 
Pantry Pride.30  At the meeting, Lazard Freres, Revlon’s investment banker, 
advised the directors that Pantry Pride’s asking price for Revlon stock was 
incredibly inadequate.31  A number of failed negotiations followed that initial 
offering, with increasing bid offers from Pantry Pride for Revlon stock.32  
Eventually, Pantry Pride announced “it would engage in fractional bidding 
and top any [other third-party] offer by a slightly higher one.”33  The Revlon 
board, however, approved a third-party proposal at a price point higher than 
the Pantry Pride bid because the Board thought the third-party proposal 





 26  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 86; see Manesh, supra note 8, at 130. 
 27  See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *69–71; see also Reder, supra note 7, at 28; 
contra Susan E. Springer, Casenote, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and the Demise of 
Section 10(b) Private Aiding and Abetting Liability: Opting for a Rule of Economic Efficiency, 
4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 213, 213 (1995) (explaining that in prior case law, the Supreme Court 
had “denied private plaintiffs the right to sue aiders and abettors under” the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act).  
 28  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (1986). 
 29  Id. at 176. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 177. 
 32  Id. at 177–78. 
 33  Id. at 178. 
 34  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179 (“The board unanimously approved Forstmann’s proposal 
because: (1) it was for a higher price than the Pantry Pride bid, (2) it protected the noteholders, 
and (3) Forstmann’s financing was firmly in place.”).  
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The Revlon court held the board of directors liable for breaching its 
fiduciary duty to its stockholders.35  The Supreme Court of Delaware created 
a new fiduciary duty: a corporation’s board of directors in a sell-side 
transaction must simply get the “best price” for its shareholders.36  
Furthermore, the court made clear that directors are “strictly held” to their 
fiduciary duties to the stockholders.37  The Delaware court found that the 
Revlon’s directors were concerned only with certain noteholders when they 
accepted the later third-party deal, rather than actually maximizing the sale 
price for the benefit of Revlon’s stockholders.38  The court reasoned that 
upon the imminent breakup and sale of the company, the Revlon “directors’ 
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders . . . .”39  Ultimately, Revlon 
created a separate duty, which stands for the rule that in M&A, sell-side 
boards of directors are held to a strict duty to obtain the best price for 
shareholders and maximize value.40 
C. Debate over the Revlon Ruling 
The Revlon ruling has inspired study and debate among scholars and 
practitioners over the past few decades.  Some, like professors Lyman 
Johnson and Robert Ricca, assert that the Revlon doctrine is obsolete and no 
longer has a profound effect on the M&A field.41  Johnson and Ricca’s thesis 
argues that courts are reluctant to hold the board liable unless there is clearly 
outrageous conduct from a board of directors.42  They argue that modern 
corporate and financial law has evolved so rapidly around Revlon that the 
importance of the doctrine has been severely diminished.43  In addition, 
Johnson and Ricca assert that the Revlon doctrine no longer helps plaintiffs 
in suits against financial advisors because the courts have bestowed a “heavy 
burden” on litigants to prove that investment advisors aided and abetted the 
 
 35  Id. at 182. No fiduciary duty was breached; instead, a new kind of duty was created by 
the Delaware Supreme Court, which applies specifically to change of control transactions.  
See id.   
 36  Id.  
 37  Id. at 181.  The court noted that this standard requires the directors to act in the best 
interest of the corporation and its shareholders, imposing “an enhanced duty to abjure any 
action that is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests.”  
Id. 
 38  Id. at 182. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.  
 41  Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Still-Dwindled Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 150 (2014).  
 42  Id. at 152. 
 43  Id. at 151. 
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breach of fiduciary duty.44 
Others, in contrast, oppose Johnson and Ricca’s argument, and explain 
that the Revlon doctrine has, in fact, expanded its reach with the evolution of 
modern corporate law and change-of-control transactions.45  For example, 
Professor Mohsen Manesh directly rejects Johnson and Ricca’s thesis.46  
Instead, Manesh explains how recent Delaware case law “underscore[s] the 
expansive reach” of the Revlon doctrine.47  Specifically, he discusses that 
Revlon’s expansion is demonstrated by the courts’ application of the doctrine 
to corporate financial advisors.48  Manesh contends that Revlon is a 
significant legal precedent today, and that “chancery court decisions 
demonstrate Revlon’s extensive grasp, reaching corporate directors, officers, 
and even corporate advisors” to protect shareholders in change-of-control 
transactions.49  Furthermore, Professor Manesh argues that the Revlon 
doctrine’s present relevancy is illustrated by continued scholarly debate and 
interest in its boundaries.50 
Although the boundaries of Revlon remain unsettled and unclear, this 
Comment supports Professor Manesh’s stance, and argues that the Revlon 
doctrine is not only still relevant, but is actually expanding further into the 
different realms of corporate law.  The Revlon doctrine, however, should be 
even further expanded to hold financial advisors to a higher standard.51  That 
is, financial advisor’s liability should not be solely dependent on a finding of 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but they should be directly 
accountable for breaches of fiduciary duties to a corporation’s shareholders 







 44  Id. at 153. 
 45  See generally Manesh, supra note 8. 
 46  See generally Manesh, supra note 8. 
 47  See generally Manesh, supra note 8, at 110.  See, e.g., In re TIBCO Software Inc. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015); In re Rural 
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 48  Manesh, supra note 8, at 129–30.  
 49  Manesh, supra note 8, at 145. 
 50  Manesh, supra note 8, at 108. 
 51  As the Rural Metro holding demonstrates, financial advisors can be held liable for 
aiding and abetting, but not direct liability to the shareholders.  See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54. 
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III. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 
A. Financial Advisors and Sell-Side Transactions 
Financial advisors, namely investment banks, have a crucial and 
profound role in, and effect on, sell-side transactions.52  Investment bankers 
have three main roles in M&A: (1) a facilitator function; (2) to give fairness 
opinions; and (3) a strategic advisory function.53  The financial advisor, as a 
facilitator, has two primary roles.  First, the investment banker must arrange 
acquisition financing.54  Raising capital is perhaps the investment banker’s 
most important function in the transaction, and his or her skillset is required 
to design complex financial plans and instruments needed to tend to certain 
transactions such as mergers.55  Second, an investment banker is an 
“auctioneer” in sell-side transactions: he or she essentially negotiates with 
the prospective acquiring companies to obtain the best share price.56  An 
investment banker’s expertise in the market and the effectiveness of certain 
share prices are crucial to negotiations.57 
Next, the financial advisor’s arguably most controversial and 
influential responsibility in M&A is to issue “fairness opinions.”58  A 
fairness opinion is an investment banker’s opinion as to whether a 
prospective acquirer’s bid is a “fair” asking price for the shares.59  These 
opinions are heavily considered by the board of directors, and may include 
the investment bankers’ recommendation of whether the board it advises 
should sell the company.60  Fairness opinions have been heavily criticized,61 
and “[m]uch of the criticism focuses on the potential for conflicts of interest 
between the shareholders, the purported beneficiaries of the opinion, and the 
investment banker.”62  The misuse of fairness opinions by financial advisors 
 
 52  See generally Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2; see also M. Breen Haire, The 
Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in Change-of-Control Transactions: In re 
Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999). 
 53  Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91. 
 54  Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91.  
 55  Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91.  
 56  Haire, supra note 52, at 291. 
 57  Haire, supra note 52, at 291. 
 58  Haire, supra note 52, at 292.  It is the most influential function of the advisor, because 
the boards’ decisions to buy or sell a company will rely heavily on the fairness opinion it 
receives from its financial advisors.  
 59  Haire, supra note 52, at 292–95; see In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., 
No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *22–23 (Oct. 20, 2015). 
 60  See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *22–23. 
 61  Haire, supra note 52, at 293 (first citing Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Investment Bankers’ 
Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 123, 127–28 (1986); 
then citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE 
L.J. 127, 141 (1988)).  
 62   Haire, supra note 52, at 293.   
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during the decision-making process can adversely influence the directors to 
injuriously accept or reject an offer from a potential acquirer, often making 
shareholders vulnerable in M&A transactions.63  Nonetheless, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has previously criticized a corporate board for not obtaining 
a fairness opinion from a financial advisor.64  In fact, today, a failure to obtain 
a fairness opinion from a financial advisor would most likely be suspect.65 
The sell-side financial advisor’s final role in M&A is to serve as a 
“strategic advisor.”66  This is the “most undefined and variable aspect of the 
[financial advisor’s] role” in change-of-control transactions.67  In this role, 
the investment banker may be asked to advise the board on the amount of 
capital, equity, or financing that the company should have readily accessible 
in the event an acquisition occurs, and to provide critical insights into certain 
bidders and financial estimates.68  These various integral roles that financial 
advisors play in modern M&A transactions give them the ability to greatly 
influence the board’s decision to sell or not sell the company. 
B. The Advisor’s Influence on the Corporation 
Financial advisors drive negotiations, and their valuations and expertise 
are what guide the board to make certain decisions.69  As savvy corporate 
players, the advisors act with full knowledge of their influence on the 
board.70 
When financial advisors, mainly investment banks, give honest and 
candid advice about sell-side transactions to boards, they play a constructive 
and important role in the process.71  When directors are overwhelmed with 
tender offers, they often turn to investment bankers for aid in evaluating and 
 
 63  See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 250. Such an action may result in financial 
harm to the shareholders due to loss of share value.  
 64  Haire, supra note 52, at 292 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876–77 (Del. 
1985)).  
 65  See Haire, supra note 52, at 292–93 (citing Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a 
Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is “Third-Party Sale Value” 
the Appropriate Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1442 (1981) (noting that nonuse of fairness 
opinion “would probably raise eyebrows”)).  
 66  Haire, supra note 52, at 295. 
 67  Haire, supra note 52, at 295. 
 68  Haire, supra note 52, at 295. 
 69  See Haire, supra note 52, at 295. 
 70  See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (where 
the advisors’ opinions were so influential that they essentially made the decisions for the 
directors); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015) (involving financial advisors’ heavy influence on the directors). 
 71  See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211 (“The investment bankers play an 
important role when they give honest advice based on their special financial expertise.”).  This 
is important to the process, because the advisors may have special expertise in the area that 
the directors do not necessarily possess.  Id. 
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structuring the bids.72  Problems arise, however, when fairness opinions are 
not necessarily specialized for each company, but are instead “made-to-
order,” supporting the positions that the directors have already taken.73  
When the boards’ interests are not parallel to those of its shareholders, these 
types of fairness opinions jeopardize shareholder investments and only mask 
the true intentions of the managers.74 
The Delaware courts have acknowledged the great influence that the 
advisors have on the corporations’ boards of directors.75  In In re Del Monte 
Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court 
acknowledged the “pivotal role” that advisors play in the transactions, and 
noted that the courts “will consider the extent to which a board has relied on 
expert advisors.”76  Furthermore, the court explained that due to the financial 
advisors’ influential and important role in the execution and implementation 
of the strategy in the transaction, advisors had to fully disclose their 
compensation and activities.77  As the Delaware Chancery Court has 
recognized, the investment banker’s influence on boards of directors cannot 
go untethered and unrestrained.78 
Therefore, there needs to be a stronger focus on the direct liability of 
financial advisors to the shareholders of the corporations they advise in sell-
side transactions.  To ensure a healthy and fruitful transaction for the 
corporations’ shareholders, the boards look to financial advisors for their 
expertise.79  As a result, the advisors have just as much power, if not more, 
to positively or negatively affect stockholder value stemming from M&A 
transactions. 
 
 72  See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211.  
 73  See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211.  
 74  See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211–12 (citing Plaza Secs. Co. v. Fruehauf 
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 
(6th Cir. 1986)) (describing that if the boards’ intentions are not in line with the shareholders’, 
untrue fairness opinions only help to mask the danger). 
 75  See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).  
 76  Id. at 844–45 (ordering a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger even though the 
board of directors acted in good faith to execute a beneficial merger, because the board, in 
fact, injured the shareholders due to the misleading and malevolent intentions of the financial 
advisor it hired).  This Comment is centered on curing cases such as In re Del Monte, where 
the financial advisor is not held liable because such liability to the shareholders is dependent 
on a finding of a breach of duty by the board.  In Del Monte, it is clear the investment bankers 
were the main reason that the sale did not result in a beneficial outcome, and their bad faith 
intentions had great influence on the directors and encouraged the sale.  Id. at 833, 836.  
Financial advisors who conduct business in this manner should be directly liable for their 
actions.  
 77  Id. at 832. 
 78  See id.; In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In 
re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 
20, 2015). 
 79  See generally Haire, supra note 52.   
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IV. MODERN EXPANSION OF THE REVLON DOCTRINE TO FINANCIAL 
ADVISORS 
A. Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers 
Due to the influence that investment bankers have on corporate 
transactions, there has been some attempt for self-regulation of financial 
advisors, but it may not be enough to protect shareholders.  A number of 
professions have turned to self-regulation of misconduct, but most to greater 
avail than investment banking.80  Professor Andrew Tuch, in his article “The 
Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers,” explains that investment bankers 
are the “masters” of the financial industry and are scrutinized by the 
Delaware courts regarding “high-stakes” change-of-control transactions.81  
Tuch acknowledges that corporations that hire financial advisors are not able 
to fend for themselves during big M&A transactions, but that vulnerability 
should not characterize the relationship between the advisors and the 
boards.82  Instead, “the relationships between investment banking firms and 
their clients are often characterized as fiduciary.”83  This suggests that 
although financial advisors do not owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders 
of corporations they advise, the advisors do owe such a duty to the boards 
that hire them.84 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the self-
regulatory entity for investment bankers and brokers.85  It is registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and functions under its 
supervision, authorized by Congress to “take action to ensure that investors 
are protected.”86  FINRA was created to serve as an internal mechanism 
whereby the investment banking community could fix some of the issues in 
the profession.87  Delaware courts may scrutinize and reprimand investment 
 
 80  See Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 241, 272–74 
(explaining that professional misconduct is governed by self-regulated entities in the fields of 
law, medicine, and accounting); Samuel J. Levine, The Law: Business or Profession?: The 
Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8, 13 (2012) (explaining the self-regulation of lawyers). 
 81  Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
101, 102 (2014). 
 82  Id.  
 83  Id.  
 84  See generally id.  Since the boards hire the advisors, the boards are considered the 
advisors’ clients.  Therefore, the advisors owe the boards a fiduciary duty.  This Comment 
argues that, by extension, the advisors should owe the companies fiduciary duties.  
 85  Id. at 104. 
 86  FINRA 2012 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report, FINRA (2012), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p291721.pdf. 
 87  Tuch, supra note 81 (discussing issues such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and 
misconduct).  
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bankers, but FINRA is responsible for disciplining them for misconduct.88 
Unfortunately, FINRA has largely been ineffective as a self-regulation 
tool and has imposed few sanctions on investment bankers.89  Tuch noted 
“enforcement activity [under FINRA] likely underdeterred investment 
bankers’ misconduct and failed to provide any credible deterrence against 
such misconduct,” and most likely resulted in burdens that were greater than 
the benefits.90  Tuch’s conclusions cause concern, considering the 
weaknesses of other programs that were meant to alleviate misconduct in 
investment banking.91 
B. Why Do the Shareholders Go After the Advisors? 
There are three main reasons that plaintiff-shareholders seek recovery 
from financial advisors in adverse sell-side transactions.  First, current 
methods of regulation do not adequately protect shareholders from 
investment banker misconduct.92  As a result, shareholders sometimes turn 
to the courts to have the advisors held liable for their participation in bad 
sales.93 
Second, plaintiff-shareholders recognize the possibility of recovering 
damages from the financial advisors’ “deeper pockets.”94  The financial 
advisors in sell-side transactions are typically investment banks, many of 
which generate some of the highest revenues in the world and earn places on 
the Fortune 500 list.95  In 2016, the top ten investment banks alone generated 
 
 88  Id. at 104 
 89  Id. at 173 (“FINRA appears to have virtually abdicated its role of enforcing its rules 
against one important category of broker-dealer: the investment banker.  Despite evidence of 
potentially pervasive misconduct, FINRA imposed remarkably few sanctions on investment 
bankers during the sixty-six month period studied.  That enforcement activity likely 
underdeterred investment bankers’ misconduct and failed to provide any credible deterrence 
against such misconduct.”). 
 90  Id. at 148–49 (“The existing system of self-regulation burdens investment bankers and 
their employers by imposing extensive qualifications and registration requirements . . . . It 
imposes other constraints on firms relating to their financial condition and operations and 
record-keeping . . . . Given the burdens and the limited deterrence benefits, it is clearly 
reasonable to believe that the costs of FINRA’s existing regulation of investment bankers, as 
now administered, exceed the benefits.”).  
 91  Id. (explaining the ineffectiveness of both the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and private enforcement in controlling investment banker misconduct). 
 92  See id. 
 93  See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re 
TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015).  
 94  Christopher A. Ward & Jarrett K. Vine, Rural Metro: Potential Avenue for Recovery 
in Bankruptcy Litigation, 33-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 23 (2014).  
 95  Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/list/ (last visited Oct. 23, 
2016); Investment Banking Scorecard, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/investment-
banking-scorecard/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
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over $54 billion in revenues.96  Notably, in 2015, the top ten investment 
banks together advised M&A transactions that totaled roughly $7 trillion 
dollars.97  Arguably, the shareholders are aware that these companies, such 
as J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs,98 have much bigger bank 
accounts and much more cash on hand than corporations’ boards of directors. 
Lastly, shareholders pursue claims against investment advisors to hold 
them accountable for their actions in the acquisitions.99  Accountability is 
incredibly important in high-value M&A transactions, because those with 
the power to make and influence decisions, such as the directors and 
advisors, should be responsible for the choices they make in structuring and 
executing change-of-control transactions.  With some skin in the game, 
advisors will be more thorough and mindful in advising the boards during 
merger negotiations.  This argument is premised on the idea that the 
misconduct of investment advisors in sell-side transactions is often the 
catalyst of the bad sale,100 and, therefore, the investment banks should be 
held directly liable for those actions. 
C. Financial Advisor Liability 
Section 102(b)(7) protects directors from breach of duty of care claims 
only, not other fiduciary duty claims such as duty of loyalty actions.101  But 
“bad faith or willing misconduct,” the required threshold for culpability, 
presents a very difficult standard for shareholders to satisfy.102  The issue 
with the current law is that the advisors’ liability is dependent upon a finding 
of liability for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors.103  
Therefore, as the law stands, financial advisors cannot be directly liable for 
their roles in M&A transactions.  This is troublesome, as it not only leaves 
shareholders vulnerable to the potential bad faith of financial advisors, but 
 
 96  Investment Banking Scorecard, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/investment-ban
king-scorecard/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).  
 97  Id.  
 98  Id.  
 99  See Tuch, supra note 81, at 163–64. 
 100  See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (where 
the advisors’ opinions were so influential that they essentially made the decisions for the 
directors); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 
20, 2015) (displaying the great influence that financial advisors can have on directors in M&A 
transactions). 
 101  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). Revlon duties are not expressly protected 
either under the statute.  See id.  
 102   Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28. 
 103  See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41.  Johnson and Ricca explain that courts’ current 
narrow application of the doctrine has largely hindered shareholder recovery from investment 
bankers for aiding and abetting.  Id. at 152–53.  Notably, while the investment banks can be 
held liable for aiding and abetting, “such persons owe no direct fiduciary duties under Revlon, 
or at all for that matter.”  Id. 
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also passively gives financial advisors a liability shield from penalties for 
their actions regarding the transactions. 
1. The Rural Metro Doctrine 
Sell-side financial advisors were first held liable in In re Rural Metro 
Corp. Stockholders Litigation,104 a decision that is paramount to the field and 
has driven case law in Delaware since its ruling in 2013.105  In Rural Metro, 
Rural Metro Corporation (Rural Metro) was in the process of being acquired 
and hired RBC Capital Markets, LLC (RBC) as a financial advisor.106  RBC 
was a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada that Rural Metro’s board of 
directors paid to assist in strategizing possible alternatives to a sale and 
advise the board of directors throughout the acquisition exploration 
period.107  Throughout its period of service to the board, RBC repeatedly 
manipulated the Rural Metro board to advance its own interests and 
maximize its earnings on the sale.108 
The Rural Metro court found that, under the Revlon standard, the Rural 
Metro board’s sale was unreasonable and that RBC was liable for knowingly 
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.109  Although the 
shareholders settled with the directors, the court held their breach of 
fiduciary duty to nonetheless be a sufficient prerequisite to finding that the 
advisors had aided and abetted the breach.110  The court, following the guide 
of section 102(b)(7), noted that the exculpatory provision in the agreement 
protected only the directors from personal liability, not RBC.111 
Furthermore, the court instructed that the plaintiffs must bear the 
burden of proof for an aiding and abetting claim.112  Since the shareholders 
settled with the board of directors and, therefore, pursued only the aiding and 
abetting claim against the advisors, the shareholders beared that burden 
 
 104  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54.  
 105  Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 23 (explaining that the Rural Metro decision was not 
only seminal for corporate litigation, but was also a crucial precedent in bankruptcy law). 
 106  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 64. 
 107  Id. at 64–67. 
 108  Id.   
 109  Id. at 110; see Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 22 (“The Delaware Chancery Court 
held the financial adviser of a target board of directors ‘liable for aiding and abetting breaches 
of fiduciary duty by the Board,’ even though (1) the board and a secondary financial adviser 
had previously settled their own liability, (2) there was no breach of the duty of loyalty found 
and (3) the company’s articles of incorporation contained a waiver of liability for the breach 
of the duty of care.  Specifically, in Rural Metro, the court held RBC Capital Markets LLC 
liable for aiding and abetting the board of Rural/Metro Corp. in breaching their fiduciary 
duties during the sale of the company to Warburg Pincus LLC.”).   
 110  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 63 (noting that the shareholders settled with the directors 
before trial, but still decided to pursue the aiding and abetting claim against RBC).  
 111  Id. at 86; see also Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 22. 
 112  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 84–85. 
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against RBC.113  In addition, the court noted the following, which is the 
essence of the Rural Metro doctrine: 
 
For purposes of the aiding and abetting claim against RBC, this 
decision need hold only that a claim for aiding and abetting a 
breach of the duty of care can be maintained . . . when a third 
party, for improper motives of its own, misleads the directors into 
breaching their duty of care.114 
 
RBC, through its manipulative and self-motivated plan, created an 
unreasonable process and informational gaps that created the board’s breach 
of fiduciary duty.115  As a result, the court found that RBC had aided and 
abetted the claim.116 
2. Current Effects and Implications of the Rural Metro 
Doctrine on Financial Advisors 
In the wake of the Rural Metro doctrine, boards of directors’ fiduciary 
duties concerning their interactions with financial advisors in M&A 
transactions are held to a higher standard, and the directors must be diligent 
and informed when conducting transactions.117  This is not a simple 
readjustment for the boards, such as exploring potential conflicts of interests 
with the financial advisors.118  Rather, there should be agreements between 
the boards and financial advisors calling for continuing disclosure of 
information that may be relevant to the board’s sale of the corporation.119 
The Rural Metro doctrine has had a profound effect on financial 
advisors, as it is now very difficult for them to avoid conflicts resulting from 
sell-side transactions.120  The financial advisors must now practice full 
 
 113  Id.  
 114  Id. at 99. 
 115  Id.  
 116  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54; Manesh, supra note 8, at 131; see Ward, supra note 94, at 
22.  
 117  Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 37 (explaining that the board of directors must now 
“be active and reasonably informed when overseeing a sale process, including identifying and 
responding to actual or potential conflicts of interest”).  
 118  Id.  
 119  See id. 
 120  Id. at 38 (“As Rural Metro makes clear, financial advisors enjoy no similar statutory 
or other protection, yet, as a practical matter, it is very difficult for them to avoid conflicts.  
To be effective, investment bankers must talk to a wide range of players—both potential 
buyers and sellers—in any given industry.  Post-Rural Metro, the key to maintaining this same 
level of effectiveness is to disclose any and all potentially material conflicts from the outset, 
and as they may arise during the course, of a sell-side engagement.  Complete and timely 
disclosure will help insulate financial advisors from aiding and abetting claims by avoiding 
the kind of ‘informational vacuum’ that led the Rural Metro [c]ourt to find that RBC had 
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disclosure with the board of directors concerning all matters of the 
transaction to give themselves the best protection against a shareholder 
liability claim for aiding and abetting a board’s breach of fiduciary duties.121  
Not only must the advisors fully disclose information to the directors, but 
they must also practice the same communication with the shareholders so 
that the shareholders are able to make fully informed decisions as to whether 
to approve the transaction.122  Furthermore, financial advisors must be 
extensive and thorough in their research of and discussions with potential 
acquirers.123  In doing so, they must ensure that they are delivering accurate 
information about the possible transactions to the board.  Ultimately, the 
“bottom line for directors and financial advisors operating in a post-Rural 
Metro world is clear: full disclosure—by sell-side [financial] advisors to 
their clients and by target company boards to their stockholders—is 
crucial.”124  Full disclosure between those parties constitutes better 
protection for the board and the financial advisors. 
3. Rural Metro Under Current Law and the “Aiding and 
Abetting” Requirement 
i. Aiding and Abetting in the Wake of Rural Metro 
A more in-depth discussion of Delaware’s requirements for aiding and 
abetting on the part of the financial advisors will give a clearer sense of 
Johnson and Ricca’s reasoning in support of their argument that the Revlon 
doctrine is insignificant.  Professor Manesh’s theory that the doctrine is still 
relevant and significant is sound, however.  Nevertheless, Manesh’s thesis 
lacks focus on the importance of further expanding the doctrine to hold 
advisors directly liable, not solely for aiding and abetting the directors’ 
breach.125  An aiding and abetting claim has four elements: “(i) the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty, (iii) knowing 
participation in the breach by the non-fiduciary defendants, and (iv) damages 
 
acted with the requisite scienter to support plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim.”). 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id.; see In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
274 (Oct. 29, 2015) (finding the shareholders’ fully informed vote invoked the business 
judgment rule, thereby negating the directors’ alleged breach of duty, and, by extension, an 
aiding and abetting claim against the advisors).  
 123  See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38 (“To be effective, investment bankers must 
talk to a wide range of players—both potential buyers and sellers—in any given industry.  
Post-Rural Metro, the key to maintaining this same level of effectiveness is to disclose any 
and all potentially material conflicts from the outset, and as they may arise the course, of a 
sell-side engagement.”). 
 124  Id. at 39.  
 125  See Johnson  & Ricca, supra note 41 (arguing the doctrine, beginning with Revlon, 
has “dwindled”); Manesh, supra note 8 (submitting that even though the liability hinges on 
aiding and abetting, the modern doctrine is expanding and adapting to modern corporate law). 
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proximately caused by the breach.”126 
For sell-side transactions, the first element requires the court to find a 
fiduciary relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders, 
which inherently exists in every corporation.127  Unless otherwise provided 
in the bylaws or articles of incorporation, a board of directors manages a 
Delaware corporation’s business.128  The directors have inherent fiduciary 
duties to the corporation and its shareholders.129  The directors must protect 
the corporation’s shareholders’ interests and serve to their benefit under the 
duties of care and loyalty.130  The choices that directors make are protected 
by the “business judgment rule,” in which “there is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.”131 
Under the second element, the board’s misuse of its “business 
judgment,” or any other action that violates its duties to shareholders, can 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.132  If the plaintiffs meet their burden of 
showing a possible breach of fiduciary duty or a misuse of business 
judgment, a heavy burden then shifts to the directors to show that their 
decision was “entirely fair.”133  In sell-side transactions, this means that the 
 
 126  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing 
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001)).  
 127  See id. at 80–81. 
 128  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016). 
 129  See William Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors 
Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 504, 
510 (Del. 1939)) (“In fulfilling their managerial responsibilities, directors of Delaware 
corporations are charged with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the corporation’s 
stockholders.”).  
 130  Id. at 841 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510) (explaining that directors must act as “trustees” 
to the organization). 
 131  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); 
see Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 841 (“When making corporate decisions, directors must 
fulfill the traditional duties of care and loyalty in order to satisfy their fiduciary obligations to 
the corporation and its stockholders . . . .  A presumption exists under Delaware law that 
corporate directors act in accordance with these duties when making business decisions.  This 
presumption is known as the ‘business judgment rule.’  The business judgment rule is a 
deferential standard of review; Delaware courts will generally refrain from unreasonably 
imposing themselves upon the business and affairs of a corporation when the board’s decision 
can be attributed to some rational corporate purpose.”); see also Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 87 
(explaining that, similar to the business judgment rule, section 102(b)(7) promotes 
stockholder interest by ensuring that the board of directors does not become overly risk-
averse). 
 132  See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97. 
 133  Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 842 (“If the business judgment rule is rebutted by 
showing a breach of either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the board’s action is 
reviewed using the entire fairness standard, and the directors bear the heavy burden of proving 
that the challenged decision or transaction is ‘entirely fair’ to the corporation and its 
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directors must show that they sold in “fair dealing” and at a “fair price.”134  
This arduous burden shift imposed on the directors bolsters the argument for 
rejection of Ricca and Johnson’s thesis and the expansion of the Rural Metro 
doctrine: if the shareholders can show a possible misuse of the directors’ 
business judgment, then their action for aiding and abetting becomes slightly 
easier to prove as the directors must then overcome the high “entirely fair” 
standard.135  If the directors cannot refute the claim, then the second element 
is satisfied, and the predicate for the aiding and abetting claim has been 
presented.136 
The third element rests on the financial advisor’s scienter.137  If the 
advisor “knows that the board is breaching its duty of care and participates 
in the breach,” then the advisor may be liable for aiding and abetting.138  To 
satisfy this element, it must be “reasonably conceivable” from the allegations 
that the financial advisor acted with the knowledge that his or her conduct 
“advocated or assisted” in the breach of a fiduciary duty.139  To meet this 
standard, the advisor must act with the knowledge that the conduct would 
further assist or create the board’s breach.140  Sometimes the knowing 
participation is so obvious that the court has no trouble assigning liability to 
the investment bankers.141  Lastly, the fourth element will be satisfied as long 
as there are cognizable damages from the bad sale.142 
 
stockholders.”).  
 134  Id.; see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); see also William 
Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 756–57 (Del. 2011) (holding that an LLC’s board of 
directors in a sell-side transaction must ensure both a fair price and fair dealing for its 
shareholders).   
 135  See Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 842  
 136  See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 265, at *79 (Oct. 20, 2015) (“For the reasons explained previously, plaintiff has 
adequately alleged a breach of the fiduciary duty of care that the Director Defendants owed 
to TIBCO, which this Court has held can form the predicate for an aiding and abetting 
claim.”).  
 137  Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.  
 138  Id. (“If the third party knows that the board is breaching its duty of care and participates 
in the breach by misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum, then the 
[advisors] can be liable for aiding and abetting.”).  
 139  TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 at *79–80 (“The requirement of participation can 
be established if the alleged aider and abettor ‘participated in the board’s decisions, conspired 
with [the] board, or otherwise caused the board to make the decisions at issue.’”).  
 140  See id.; see also In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 837 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (“Under this standard, a bidder’s attempts to reduce the sale price through arm’s-
length negotiations cannot give rise to liability for aiding and abetting.”). 
 141  See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97, and TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 at *79–80, 
where the knowing participation was obvious to both courts.  
 142  See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001). 
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ii. The Rural Metro Doctrine Under Current Case Law 
The Rural Metro doctrine and its ruling on financial advisor liability 
precisely lends to the high standard that Johnson and Ricca refer to in their 
thesis, as the doctrine is one of the many reasons that plaintiffs’ actions 
against the financial advisors are often to no avail.143  The financial advisor 
does not owe fiduciary duties directly to the corporate client, but they may, 
nonetheless, be indirectly liable to the shareholders.144 
Since the Rural Metro ruling, the Delaware courts have ruled on a 
number of other cases concerning the liability of boards and financial 
advisors in sell-side transactions.  First, in RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. 
Jervis, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Rural Metro ruling.145  The 
Court noted that RBC knowingly misled the directors by giving the board 
inaccurate and ill-motivated information regarding the sale of the company 
to another entity.146  Driven by its own improper motives, “RBC misled the 
Rural directors into breaching their duty of care, thereby aiding and abetting 
the Board’s breach of its fiduciary obligations.”147 
Likewise, in In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held Goldman Sachs, acting as the financial 
advisor in the sell-side merger deal, liable for aiding and abetting a breach 
of fiduciary duty by the board of directors.148  In TIBCO, Goldman Sachs 
more than simply aided in the breach—it created the breach by advising the 
board based on its own motivations and intentions to maximize the sale.149  
 
 143  See Johnson, supra note 41.  Contra Manesh, supra note 8.  Rural Metro involved 
extreme facts, and shareholders have since been largely unsuccessful in their actions against 
the advisors.  See In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 1003 (Del. 
Ch. 2014); Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re Zale Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 249, at *76–78 (Oct. 1, 2015), 
rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (Oct. 29, 2015). 
 144  Manesh, supra note 8; see Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54; see also Royce de R. Barondes, 
Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 45, 76 (1998) (“An investment bank that provides substantial assistance in the 
consummation of a transaction that the investment bank knows or should know to be in 
violation of a board’s fiduciary duty aids or abets the board’s primary violation and thus will 
be liable to the beneficiary of the duty.  The cost of that risk ultimately will be reflected in 
fees paid to such professionals by firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency.”). 
 145  RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
 146  Id. at 863. 
 147  Id.  
 148  In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
265, at *85 (Oct. 20, 2015). 
 149  Id. (“[I]t is reasonably conceivable from the facts alleged in the Complaint that 
Goldman was motivated to and intentionally created an informational vacuum by failing to 
disclose material information to the Board at a critical time when it was evaluating and 
reconsidering its options concerning whether it could act to secure some or all of the $100 
million in additional equity value that the Board mistakenly believed it had obtained when 
approving the Merger.  As such, the Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for aiding and 
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Yet, under Delaware law, the plaintiffs could bring only an aiding and 
abetting cause of action.150 
Subsequent cases threatened the aiding and abetting cause of action.  
For example, in In re KKR Financial Holdings LLC Shareholder Litigation, 
the Delaware Chancery Court granted a motion to dismiss an aiding and 
abetting claim against a sell-side financial advisor because it found no 
predicate breach of fiduciary duty.151  That decision was affirmed in Corwin 
v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, where the Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
the lower court’s decision, but also established significant precedent that 
threatened the aiding and abetting liability imposed on directors.152  The 
court held that the shareholders’ “disinterested” vote to approve the sale 
invoked the business judgment rule, which protected the board from a 
possible breach of fiduciary duty and thereby shielded the advisors from 
liability.153 
Corwin’s impact is displayed in Delaware’s Zale I and Zale II rulings.  
In Zale I, which was decided before Corwin, the Delaware Chancery Court 
denied a motion to dismiss a claim against a sell-side financial advisor for 
aiding and abetting a corporation’s board.154  After Corwin, however, the 
same court reheard the case in Zale II.155  The court reversed its decision by 
applying Corwin’s holding and reasoning that, because there was a “fully-
informed” and “disinterested” shareholder vote, the business judgment rule 
applied.156  Therefore, the claim against the financial advisor for aiding and 
abetting was dismissed.157  After the Zale II ruling, “financial advisors 




abetting the Director Defendants’ [breach of the] duty of care.”).  
 150  See generally In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); 
In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 20, 2015); RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); see also 
Manesh, supra note 8, at 130. 
 151  In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
((“An aiding and abetting claim ‘may be summarily dismissed based upon the failure of the 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against the director defendants.’”) (citation omitted)). 
 152  Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 153  Id. at 306; see Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 281.  
 154  In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 249, at *76–78 (Oct. 1, 
2015), rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (Oct. 29, 2015); see Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 
281. 
 155  In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, (Oct. 
29, 2015); see Reder, supra note 3, at 281. 
 156  Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, at *7.  
 157  Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274. 
 158  Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 281.   
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Ultimately, recent case law demonstrates that under the Delaware 
courts’ application of the Rural Metro doctrine, financial advisors will be 
found liable only in sell-side transactions for “aiding and abetting” a board’s 
breach of fiduciary duties, but will not be held directly liable.159  Thus, the 
only way shareholders may successfully file suit against sell-side financial 
advisors is by a court finding that: (1) the directors had a fiduciary duty to 
the shareholders and that they breached that duty; and (2) the investment 
advisors aided and abetted the directors in the breach of that duty.160  This 
becomes increasingly difficult if the shareholders are allowed an informed 
vote to approve the merger.161 
It is both the weakness of the aiding and abetting tort and the strictness 
of the Rural Metro doctrine, among other things, that fuel the argument that 
the doctrine, rooted in Revlon, has begun to diminish,162 and that Rural Metro 
left plaintiffs with nothing other than a heavier burden and a “long-shot 
aiding and abetting claim.”163  Nonetheless, regardless of the difficulties and 
downsides of bringing the claim, following Rural Metro, there was a 
dramatic increase in aiding and abetting claims against sell-side financial 
advisors.164  As discussed, financial advisor aiding and abetting liability is 
completely dependent on a finding of breach of fiduciary duty by the board 
regardless of the level of misconduct, ill will, and bad faith by the advisors.165  
Professor Manesh is justified in saying the doctrine is still significant and is 
adapting to modern corporate law,166 but his thesis falls short of the current 
 
 159  See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re 
TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 
20, 2015); RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
 160  See Rural, 88 A.3d 54; see also Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28 (explaining that 
the financial advisors do not receive the same protections as individual directors under section 
102(b)(7)). 
 161  See Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274.  If the shareholders were allowed a vote on the 
transaction, a suit against the advisors, or directors for that matter, may be less likely to be 
successful, as they themselves had already approved the merger. 
 162  Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41 (arguing that the Rural Metro doctrine has “dwindled” 
over time).  
 163  Id. at 153 (“But the burden in a Revlon setting can be heavier yet where, as in Rural 
Metro, the directors are not defendants in the case because then the plaintiff must also prove 
that the directors breached a fiduciary duty.  This leaves the plaintiff, not the defendants, with 
all the burdens—very high ones—in a long-shot aiding and abetting claim.  Rural Metro is a 
cautionary tale for egregiously conflicted financial advisers, but, from a remedies perspective, 
it is a distinct outlier.  These types of claims may arise in Revlon settings—where they 
typically fail—but they are not uniquely Revlon duty claims, and they do not ‘limit’ our 
thesis.”). 
 164  Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28 (suggesting that Rural Metro was essentially the 
catalyst that bridged the gap from Revlon, focused mainly on directors and boards, to the 
modern targeting of the financial advisors in sell-side transactions). 
 165  See In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 166  See Manesh, supra note 8, at 110. 
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and imminent need to take the liability for financial advisors to the next level. 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING SELL-SIDE FINANCIAL 
ADVISORS LIABLE 
A. Sell-Side Financial Advisors Should be Held to a Higher 
Standard 
In much of the recent case law, the financial advisors not only 
knowingly participated in a board’s breach of fiduciary duties, but they 
induced the breach to advance their own interests.167  When the advisor’s 
conduct is that clear, the plaintiff shareholders should not have to find a 
breach of fiduciary duty by the directors as a predicate.  Instead, they should 
be able to hold the financial advisors directly accountable for their actions, 
perhaps in the form of a direct derivative suit against the advisors.  The 
advisors’ liability in such situations should not depend on that of the 
directors.168 
Contrary to the idea that the Revlon doctrine has dwindled,169 the 
doctrine has in fact expanded through Rural Metro, with its sights set on 
greater shareholder protection through imposing liability on financial 
advisors in sell-side M&A transactions.170  The increasing amount of 
shareholder litigation generated by change-of-control transactions 
demonstrates the Rural Metro doctrine’s contemporary importance and 
relevance.171  While Johnson and Ricca question the limitations of the 
doctrine in its ability to actually hold financial advisors liable in sell-side 
transactions,172 the availability of a cause of action against the advisors, 
regardless of the limitations and difficulties, shows the doctrine has, in fact, 
expanded since Revlon to adapt to modern corporate law.173  The doctrine 
has not shown its age, and, as can be seen in Rural Metro and other recent 
 
 167  See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. 
Ch. 2014). 
 168  See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *79 (aiding and abetting liability for breach 
of fiduciary duty is dependent on the “predicate” finding of that breach on the part of the 
directors); see also In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
249 (Oct. 1, 2015), rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (2015) (granting advisors’ motion to 
dismiss because there was no liability found on the part of the directors).  
 169  See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41. 
 170  See Manesh, supra note 8 (suggesting that the doctrine is actually expanding to adapt 
to modern corporate law and the greater protection of shareholders). 
 171  See Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 279–80.  
 172  See generally Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41. 
 173  See Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(applying the ruling only to directors’ liability). But see In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders 
Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (expanding the doctrine to liability for financial advisors). 
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cases, is actually an incredibly important emerging doctrine through which 
plaintiffs can hold the wolves of the corporate world liable for taking 
advantage of their vulnerability.174 
Yet, there needs to be further expansion in the courts, and possibly the 
legislature, to hold investment bankers and other financial advisors liable 
when they pursue only their own, and not stockholder, interests.  The 
financial advisors need to be held accountable for their misconduct, as their 
misleading actions have been punished too weakly for too long.175  As 
discussed in Part III(A), financial advisors play major roles in the sell-side 
transaction and boards rely heavily on their advice.176  The financial advisors 
have a great impact on the boards and the corporations that they advise,177 
and any misconduct or misleading information can have negative impacts on 
the transactions.178 
Johnson and Ricca highlight that financial advisors, particularly 
investment banks, can be held liable for aiding and abetting, but “such 
persons owe no direct fiduciary duties under Revlon, or at all for that 
matter.”179  This statement should not be adhered to by the Delaware courts 
and legislators.  Instead, the modern doctrine stemming from Rural Metro 
should be expanded even further to impose fiduciary duties on the financial 
advisors, or at least hold them to a higher standard of direct liability.180  There 
should be no required predicate for finding the directors liable for breach of 
duty to recover from the financial advisors, as it is a hurdle for shareholders 
and makes direct action against adverse financial advisers impossible.181  
Aiding and abetting liability under Revlon and Rural Metro is not enough—
 
 174  See Rural, 88 A.3d 54; In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-
CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015). 
 175  See Reder, supra note 3, at 279 (explaining that, in their search for “deep-pocketed” 
defendants, shareholders have recently begun to seek recovery from financial advisors).  That 
liability has, thus far, only been allowed in the form of aiding and abetting.  See generally In 
re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re TIBCO Software 
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); RBC 
Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); see also Manesh, supra note 8, at 
130. 
 176  See generally Haire, supra note 52 (explaining the three main roles that financial 
advisors have in banking).  
 177  See supra Part III. 
 178  Haire, supra note 52, at 295; see Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211–12; see 
also In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (where the 
actions of the advisor heavily influenced the board to make a bad sale). 
 179  Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41, at 152.  
 180  See Manesh, supra note 8 (explaining that financial advisory liability is dependent on 
that of the board).  
 181  See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015) (demonstrating that the court requires a “predicate” finding of 
director liability before liability can be imposed on the advisor).  
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investment bankers need to be held accountable for their negligent and 
adverse actions in M&A transactions, and should not have the double-
protection of: (1) the hurdle the plaintiffs have to pass in finding liability on 
the part of the board; and (2) the weakness of “aiding and abetting,” as 
opposed to a form of direct liability. 
There was a hint of hope for this argument when the Chancery Court of 
Delaware suggested in the Rural Metro proceedings that financial advisors, 
particularly investment bankers, are “gatekeepers” who may have some 
fiduciary responsibilities to the companies they advise.182  Although the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not rule parallel to this argument, at least one 
Delaware Court judge has pondered holding the advisors to both a higher 
standard and to direct fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the 
corporation.183 
B. Possible Counter-Arguments 
The argument for direct liability on the advisors in M&A transactions 
is new and expansive, and, therefore, there are several potential counter-
arguments.  First, some may posit that a more expansive standard would be 
too invasive on investment bankers and deter them from advising 
corporations in sell-side transactions.  An expansion of the doctrine, 
however, would not deter advisors from participating in sell-side 
transactions; rather, it would most likely deter misconduct.  Many of the 
largest investment banks generate hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue 
through advising M&A deals.184  Therefore, it is likely that they would not 
cease advising activities because the standard was heightened.  Instead, they 
would most likely adapt to the new corporate law just as they have adapted 
to Revlon and Rural Metro.185 
In addition, some scholars may object to judicial overreach, in 
particular that courts should not create fiduciary duties that do not exist.186  
They may argue that courts should not be allowed to impose such restrictions 
and standards as doing so is a slippery slope: courts may soon use it as a way 
 
 182  Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38; In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 
A.3d 54, 87 (Del. Ch. 2014) (explaining that financial advisors are “gatekeepers” in sell-side 
change-of-control transactions). 
 183  See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 88 (suggesting that advisors as “gatekeepers” may owe 
fiduciary duties of their own). 
 184  See Investment Banking Scorecard, supra note 96; Fortune 500, supra note 95.  
 185  See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38.  Many of the investment banks listed on the 
Fortune 500 are the largest companies and, arguably, would not cease their advising activities 
just because the standard has been heightened. 
 186  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2016).  The Delaware General Corporation Law does 
not provide that fiduciary duties exist between financial advisors and boards of directors or 
the corporations they counsel. See id. 
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to abuse judicial power.187  Expanding the Rural Metro doctrine, however, 
would not be a judicial overstep because the courts would be confined to that 
which is warranted by the contemporary corporate world, namely the 
protection of shareholders and traded corporations.  With so much money at 
stake in M&A, and so much litigation resulting from sell-side transactions, 
there needs to be more accountability and higher standards to protect 
shareholders.188 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is an increasing need for the Delaware courts and legislature to 
take action to protect shareholders in sell-side transactions.  Financial 
advisor control in modern sell-side transaction is undeniable.  There are 
mergers valued at trillions of dollars annually, with investment banks 
generating billions of dollars of revenues from advising those deals.  In the 
wake of Revlon and Rural Metro, there has been a sharp increase in 
shareholder litigation against corporations’ financial advisors.  Rural Metro 
and other modern case law have expanded the Revlon doctrine to adapt to 
the contemporary corporate environment by allowing shareholders to 
recover from financial advisors for aiding and abetting claims.  The aiding 
and abetting claim, however, has proven too weak to hold the advisors liable 
for their own misconduct when the court does not find a predicate breach of 
the board’s fiduciary duties. 
Therefore, the Delaware courts and legislature must further expand the 
Rural Metro doctrine to allow for direct financial advisor liability to the 
shareholders.  This may come in the form of either Delaware-court created 
fiduciary duties owed by the advisors to the shareholders, or a heightened 
standard imposed by the Delaware legislature that removes the requirement 
of a finding of liability on the board of directors.  Ultimately, Delaware needs 
to adapt to emerging corporate needs, as it did with section102(b)(7), Revlon, 
and Rural Metro, and continue to protect the shareholders of its corporations. 
 
 
 187  See Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469 
(1999) (defining “slippery slope” and its implications).  
 188  See Investment Banking Scorecard, supra note 96; see also Reder & Estey, supra note 
3, at 280.  
